

because they do not have access to all the facts that the President has.

11. Members are angry about the President's refusal to give Congress all the facts, but cannot do anything because it is unconstitutional to subpoena a Presidential fact man and ask him what's going on in the Government.

12. Nothing can be done in February because too many members have out-of-town speaking engagements at Lincoln Day dinners of Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners.

13. Nothing can be done about foreign policy because it is unconstitutional for members to interfere with the President's conduct of foreign policy.

14. Nothing can be done about the President's usurpation of Congress's constitutional right to declare war because it is silly, in this modern day and age, for a rinkydink outfit like Congress to accuse the President of unconstitutional behavior.

15. The seniority system prevents members from doing anything.

16. Nothing can be done because of the ineptitude of the leadership.

17. It is summer and members' wives and children are browbeating them to go away on vacations; in this strained atmosphere members, already tired of long months of furious idleness, are in no mood to do anything.

18. The polls suggest that nobody has thought about Congress for months, but may, if members do anything.

19. After laboring months at not cutting the Pentagon's weapons budget, Congress is too spent to do anything.

20. Although members suspect that the Air Force's new nuclear-powered, supersonic, short-takeoff-and-landing survey with a fringe on the top will be a multibillion-dollar bust, nothing can be done because the Pentagon is only asking for token funds for a feasibility study.

21. Although members realize that the Army's antimissile underwater tank leaks water through the TV aerial holes and sinks with heavy loss of life every time it is tested, nothing can be done about spending \$4 billion more to perfect it because, otherwise, the \$4 billion already spent would have to be written off as wasted.

22. Nothing can be done because of the filibuster.

23. Since the President will do anything that needs to be done, there is no point in Congress doing anything, particularly since the Supreme Court will have to do it if the President refuses.

24. Not doing anything is safe.

25. There is no modern precedent for doing anything.

In spite of these and several thousand other reasons for its futility, Congress is not entirely impotent. Sometime late next year the vast majority of its members will persuade us all that they deserve to be re-elected.

PROGRESS ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S ECONOMIC GAME PLAN

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, on October 7, President Nixon outlined phase two of his economic game plan. It is very popular with the American people. Just as the American people quickly supported the President after his initial announcement of the wage-price freeze in August, grassroots support will continue into the post-freeze period. A telephone survey conducted by the Philadelphia Inquirer showed those approving of the President's economic policy leading by a 2 to 1 margin.

I ask unanimous consent to have the survey printed in the RECORD, which shows that 66.9 percent of the American

people approve of the President's post-freeze economics plan.

There being no objection, the survey was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DO YOU APPROVE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S POST-FREEZE ECONOMICS PLAN?

HOW YOU VOTED

Yes: 66.9 percent.

No: 33.1 percent.

SAMPLE "YES" COMMENTS

"Nixon is doing his best to help the country" . . . "The unions needed to be put in their place" . . . "Let's give the poor guy a chance" . . . "I believe Nixon has saved us from another depression" . . . "I hope he freezes taxes, too" . . . "Although it might be too little, too late" . . . "It's the only way to keep prices and unions from going wild" . . . "This should be adopted on a permanent basis" . . . "I'm for anything that will benefit our country" . . . "This should have happened two years ago" . . . "It's about time the government took over from the unions" . . . "Now labor can't lead us around by the nose."

BOLD ACTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT LAST WEEK

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, last week was a very good week for the United States. The President achieved three important objectives.

First, his announcement of the forthcoming journey to Moscow for the purpose of discussing ways which can lead to peace and a relaxation of tensions.

Second, the President skillfully managed to obtain the cooperation of labor and industry in his pay and price board setup. The President will send up a bill covering phase II of his economic plan today, which will provide for an important extension of powers under the Emergency Stabilization Act and also standby powers on interest and dividends, with penalties and provisions for judicial review.

Third, the President secured the release of the import surcharge to several Asian countries, notably Japan, in return for an important textile agreement.

Mr. President, this is real action. No other President has been as innovative and as bold in my time or has introduced and so successfully followed up such immensely valuable objectives as this President.

All of us have seen and heard critics of the President, completely devoid of issues, who have sought vainly to criticize various persons as nominees for the Supreme Court in advance of their submission by the President.

I think it would be an act of grace and an act of good judgment if the overly zealous and overly ambitious critics would withhold judgment until they find out who the President is going to nominate. I think their rush to exercise their judgment over that of the President is unseemly. It does not reflect on the President so much as it does on them.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from

Missouri is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

THE AMERICAN PROFILE IN CAMBODIA

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, 6 months ago, on April 10 and 11, I went to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to assess personally the situation and the extent of direct American involvement in the war there.

I was pleased and impressed as Ambassador Emory Swank pointed with pride to the "low American profile" there and expressed his desire to keep it that way. Swank asserted:

If real trouble comes, our Embassy staff can pack up and get out on one plane.

Three days later I visited with the man who was responsible for our low profile in Cambodia, Jonathan Fred Ladd, who was hospitalized in Saigon with a bad back. Ladd had been a Special Forces commander in South Vietnam. He knew the value of relying on the Cambodians' will to fight rather than on ever-increasing dependence on U.S. advisers, air support and the sophisticated weaponry of war with which we have smothered the South Vietnamese. He believed that if the Cambodians had the will to fight they would survive, but that if they lacked the will, the United States could not save them. Sophisticated U.S. weapons, methods, and advisers would create more problems than they solved, Ladd believed.

Again, I was impressed. From what I could gather, Cambodia appeared to be the first real test for President Nixon's "Guam" doctrine of limited assistance and self-help. When I returned from Southeast Asia I wrote a report which, then, included the following observations:

"In a very real sense, this is one war," said Ambassador Emory Swank as he briefed me on my arrival at Phnom Penh, the capital city. . . .

It is "one war" now, covering the entirety of French Indochina. And yet, it is being fought differently in Cambodia. . . .

In Cambodia, the United States seems determined not to stumble into another massive U.S. commitment like Vietnam. Quite properly, the emphasis is on supplying Cambodians to fight for themselves, not on us fighting for them. . . .

What Cambodia needs is time to train and build its army without the mistakes of Vietnamization. So far, that time has not been purchased by a massive American presence, and I was impressed by Ambassador Swank's determination that it will not be. . . .

Last year, I voted against additional U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia because I feared it would be the opening wedge of a Vietnam-type commitment. This year I would support U.S. economic assistance, provided that the present hands-off direction of our policy in that country is continued. . . .

That American policy in Cambodia appears to be changing: The October 18 edition of Newsweek contains a distressing article which indicates that our "low profile" policy in Cambodia is being escalated. Now Ambassador Swank refers to a "medium profile" as the American presence in Phnom Penh has jumped from fewer than 60 officials to more than 150.

And the article reports that the Defense Department is going ahead with plans to expand MEDT—the Military Equipment Delivery Team—forces to 500 by the end of next year.

According to Newsweek—

There are signs that the military men already in Cambodia are getting more directly involved in the fighting there. American helicopters have reportedly begun transporting Cambodian troops into battle areas and supplying them with ammunition. And at Pochentong Airport in Phnom Penh, U.S. forces recently opened a radio center (officially called a "navigation aid") to coordinate air support for Cambodian troops.

But planned escalation is not confined to personnel increases alone. Although this year's aid program for Cambodia calls for \$211 million in military aid, \$110 million in economic assistance and \$20 million in agricultural commodities for a total of \$341 million—a net increase of \$59 million over last year—the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently want another \$52 million for military aid.

According to a story in the New York Times October 13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designed a costly program of "pacification" and other "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, as well as ways to get more money to implement it than Congress is willing to authorize.

According to the Times, the Joint Chiefs have devised a battle plan to outflank the intent of Congress. According to this report the Chiefs offered four different ways of generating—on the sly—the additional \$52 million they want:

The first way would be simply to transfer \$52 million from the economic aid program to military spending, which can be done later in the fiscal year simply by the Administration's notifying Congress. The second way would be to use the economic aid fund for the purchase of all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing other military funds.

A third way would be to increase procurement for the United States Army by \$52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth way would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring additional equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

Mr. President, if these reports are true, and past experience suggests that they probably are, it appears that the United States role in Cambodia is escalating significantly as more American dollars and more American personnel are becoming more involved in the war there.

The pattern is all too familiar to repeat: A tentative commitment becomes firm; a temporary presence becomes permanent; a limited role expands, and the executive branch of Government circumvents or ignores the advice and intent of Congress, if not the actual provisions of laws.

And the unanticipated results, as we have found in Vietnam, can be disastrous.

Mr. President, the Senate will soon be making important decisions regarding the amount, scope, and type of aid to Cambodia when the Foreign Assistance Act comes to the floor.

The Foreign Relations Committee has taken an important step toward limiting

the scope of our growing involvement there by voting to impose a \$250 million ceiling on military and economic aid and to limit the number of U.S. civilian and military personnel to 200.

Since I came to the Senate in 1969, Congress has been attempting to restore the constitutional balance in the war-making power. Many Senators have recognized that executive branch ability to make war unilaterally is a very real danger to democracy. As Senator JOHN STENNIS stated the other day before the Foreign Relations Committee while testifying on bills dealing with congressional war powers:

The President is faced with difficult day-to-day decisions in the Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy and the temptation is great to rely upon the threat of military force against a particularly troublesome or recalcitrant opponent.

But he went on to point out:

But the Constitution has placed the responsibility for deciding whether or not that force is to be used in the hands of the Legislative Branch. Thus it is not only our right but our Constitutional duty to insist that the President obtain the sanction of the Congress, the peoples' representatives, before he actually involves the nation in war.

Mr. President, it is clear that Executive decisions have shaped the course of the Indochina war and that an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on Executive actions. I recognize that some politicians will continue to prefer inaction or deference to the Executive in the exercise of a policy that could result in war, for scapegoats are often popular in politics and the assumption of responsibility often is not.

I feverently hope that such failure to accept responsibility is a thing of the past.

If the reports on Cambodia are true, as I believe they are, it should be clear that current and planned executive branch actions could take us into another ill-advised military adventure.

Congress has the ability to set wise limits on such dangerous Executive policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has given us a vehicle, in the Symington-Case amendment, for setting a proper limit in Cambodia.

Mr. President, I am pleased at this time to yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE).

THE PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for 7 minutes.

THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CEILINGS ON U.S. SPENDING AND PERSONNEL IN CAMBODIA

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I commend him for the remarks he has made and for the activities he has engaged in on this matter on several occasions in the past. He has been most helpful to the Senate and to the Nation in regard to the problems we are facing here. I am happy that his remarks preceded mine on this subject. Mr. President, the time has come for the United States as a Nation to decide what to do about Cambodia.

Recent press reports indicate what the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel must be done if we are to bring about a military solution in Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs' plan calls for a doubling of military expenditures and almost a five fold increase in the size of the Cambodian army.

Those are very disturbing proposals.

In no event, however, should the fundamental question of whether the United States becomes even more deeply involved in yet another Southeast Asian country be decided within the executive branch under a veil of secrecy.

I thought we had painfully learned this lesson from our Vietnam experience, but the reports on the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for Cambodia would seem to indicate the strong possibility that we may be about to repeat past mistakes.

My own view is that the overwhelming majority of Congress and the American people do not wish to repeat the Vietnam example.

We on the Foreign Relations Committee have on several occasions asked the Secretary of Defense for the 5 year plans for military assistance programs. We have always been refused access to these documents.

It is indeed unfortunate that we have to rely on leaks of secret papers to receive the plans for Cambodia. But considering the vast scope of the Joint Chiefs' proposals for that country, I can understand why the Pentagon has been reluctant to expose its thinking. The aid levels and force levels described in the New York Times and the Washington Post are so large that it is difficult to believe they could stand up to either congressional or public scrutiny.

If the proposals of the Joint Chiefs were put into effect, Cambodia would be turned into an armed camp absolutely dependent on us for its existence. And this would not just be for a year or two, but for the indefinite future. The Joint Chiefs project an expansion of the current 170,000 man Cambodian armed forces, 863,000 by 1977. In a country of less than 7 million people, we would then be supporting a military establishment which would be the proportional equivalent of more than 25 million Americans under arms.

It is of course the right of the Cambodians to decide how large their army will be, but it becomes very much our concern when the American taxpayer is asked to pay the bill. And there is no question that the United States would be paying virtually all the costs. The war has left the Cambodians themselves nearly without resources. As long as the fighting continues, they will be deprived of their three principal sources of foreign exchange: rice, rubber, and tourism. Moreover, as we found out in Vietnam, our other allies will do little if anything to share the costs.

The Joint Chiefs further propose that we get involved at all levels of Cambodian society with pacification programs, psychological warfare programs, and even unconventional warfare programs directed by the CIA. Again, as we learned in Vietnam, these kinds of American supported programs all lead to deeper and deeper entanglement.